Basic Income: A Comparative Study of Brazil and India by Hassan, Aisha
1 
 
 
 
 
Basic Income:  
A Comparative Study of Brazil and India 
Have we learned enough about Basic Income to consider it a successful policy for poverty 
alleviation? How can we explain results from India and Brazil using our current knowledge? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lund University 2016, NEKH01 
Author: Aisha Hassan 
Supervisor: Andreas Bergh 
  
2 
 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 4 
1.1 Basic Income ................................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 India ................................................................................................................................. 5 
1.3 Brazil ................................................................................................................................ 6 
1.4 Thesis Layout .................................................................................................................. 7 
2. Methodological and Conceptual Framework .................................................................... 7 
2.1. Security Difference Principle ........................................................................................ 9 
2.2 Paternalism Test Principle ........................................................................................... 10 
2.3 Rights Not Charity Principle ....................................................................................... 10 
2.4 Ecological Constraint Principle ................................................................................... 10 
2.5 Dignified Work Principle ............................................................................................. 11 
2.6 Economic and Implementary Constraint Principle .................................................. 11 
3. Theoretical Framework ..................................................................................................... 11 
3.1 Rawls Theory of Justice ............................................................................................... 12 
3.2 Labor Economics and Employment Incentives ......................................................... 13 
4. Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 15 
4.1 Security Difference Principle ....................................................................................... 16 
4.2 Paternalism Test Principle ........................................................................................... 17 
4.3 Rights Not Charity Principle ....................................................................................... 19 
4.4 Ecological Constraint Principle ................................................................................... 20 
4.5 Dignified Work Principle ............................................................................................. 21 
4.6 Economic and Implementary Constraint Principle .................................................. 22 
4.7 Other Results................................................................................................................. 24 
4.8 Summary of Results...................................................................................................... 24 
5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 25 
6. References ........................................................................................................................... 26 
 
  
3 
 
Abstract 
Do we know enough about Basic Income (BI) to support or discharge it? In this paper, two 
studies on the subject are reviewed in order to answer this question. One is the pilot study of 
Unconditional Basic Income in rural India (conducted by SEWA and UNICEF in 2011-2013) 
and the other is the Bolsa Escola/ Bolsa Familia program that was launched in Brazil in 1995 
and is still ongoing. The aim is to map out different and similar components and results of the 
two implementations of BI and to compare them to each other, and also to compare the results 
to the theoretical and empirical expectations.  
The questions that are answered by this paper are: 
1. What were the results of the Indian and Brazilian BI studies, and were they similar to 
the ones that could be expected from theoretical and empirical experience? 
2. Are the results convincing enough to make future policy recommendations in favor of 
Basic Income in other countries? 
To examine these two studies a six-principle framework is used, covering different aspects, 
which aim to determine the successfulness of a policy. Rawls Theory of Justice and classic 
labor economic theories are used to analyze the results. The analysis shows that the 
components that were present in both studies were the overall reduction on levels of poverty 
(school participation rates, health and equality). This despite the Indian study being universal 
to all within the test villages, and the Brazilian study being selective and conditional, which is 
not in line with what could be expected from theory. As was expected from the labor supply 
curve, there was a small drop in labor supply detected in both studies, even if the overall 
productivity was perceived better in the Indian villages with the BI. In these two cases the 
impact of a BI was successful, but since the two studies differ largely more research on what 
role local factors play is relevant in order to make recommendations in other countries for 
implementing BI policies. 
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1. Introduction 
Our world is more economically unequal than ever before, when comparing on nation level. 
One could, though expand the reasoning and talk about the populations of countries in the 
measurement, what Milanovic (2013) would call inequality 2, and find different results.  New 
alternatives are debated in order to solve this socio-economic problem, which causes absolute 
and relative deprivation (Polanyi, 2007) within and between both countries and the global 
South and West. The focus in this paper is on developing countries, since the need for 
improved economic models are most prevalent there. Actions in form of loans and conditional 
aid from international institutions and high-income countries have been the most common 
remedy in the past. How will these actions look in the future? Could Basic Income be a way 
for developing countries to help themselves, either as a supplement or as an alternative to 
international aid? This paper seeks to shed light on this question. 
The idea to give out cash transfers is not new in the economic debate; some authors like 
French socialist Charles Fourier trace it as far back as to 1690’s philosopher John Locke and 
his Natural Argument (Van Parijs, 1992). This basically claims that every human on earth has 
a right to fish, hunt and grow cattle to cover her survival needs. When people are kept from 
these survival/food securing actions to the extent that they cannot cover their needs they 
should be compensated by (the company, government or institution) that is blocking her 
natural right. In the 1960s the idea of a Negative Income Tax (NIT) was introduced by 
Augustin Cournot, which was later developed to an unconditional model by Friedman and 
Tobin (Tod, 2008; Van Parijs, 2004). Another name often associated with BI is Rawls and his 
“Theory of Justice” introduced 1970 which is believed to be inspired by Locke (Van Parijs 
1992). Rawls is incorporated both in the theory and methodology of this paper, since his 
Theory of Justice provides clear lines on what he believes is fair in social distribution, and 
also because it is quite different from what classic economic theories suggest. 
What is then a successful policy? In order to determine the results of these two BI studies in 
India and Brazil a framework of six different principles is used to map out and clarify the 
results (presented more in detail in the Methodology chapter). The attempt to move further 
than classic economic theory, which is also incorporated of course, is thought to enable a 
more diverse comparison. This framework covers social, structural, psychological and 
ecological aspects along with economic feasibility.  
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1.1 Basic Income 
The formal definition of a BI is a fixed amount paid regularly each period (week, month or 
year, rather than a one time endowment) to all members of a political community. Other terms 
used are cash transfers, citizen wage, and cash-bonuses etcetera. A BI is distributed by the 
government of the community and funded by a public resource. It comes with no 
conditionality such as school or work participation, and is not means tested. In contrast to a 
fixed remedy such as food stamps or subsidized food, a BI is paid in money (BIEN, 2015; 
Van Parijs, 2004).  
Around the time of World War I, the US presidential candidate Milner incorporated earlier 
suggestions from Bertrand Rusell of a basic income into his presidential campaign (Van Parijs, 
2003). There are also different variants of BI policies currently in many European countries, 
which were mostly adopted after World War II, with Denmark and Holland in the lead (BIEN, 
2015; Van Parijs, 2000). However none of these BI policies fulfill all the requirements of a 
theoretical Basic Income. One example is Sweden’s “Economic Aid”, which you are eligible 
to only if you are unemployed for minimum amount of time, and upon receiving the aid you 
can be required to enter a program helping you to actively seek work (Socialtjänsten 2015). 
The most common qualification to receive BI is one’s need for it, which defeats the idea of it 
being universal. 
The only known real basic income in use today, working according to its definition, is the one 
in Alaska. Each year every resident who has lived in the state for minimum two years, receive 
part of the revenues from the state-owned oil through the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF)  
(Brown & Thomas, 1994).  
1.2 India 
In India the public policy has been a work in progress since its independence 1947, with 
different programs to improve health, education and food security (Nakray, 2015). These are 
generally managed through the Public Distribution System (PDS). Even though the country 
has been in growing economically during the last decades, the impoverished parts of the 
population are not experiencing this change (Standing 2012). With a total of 1.2 billion people 
in 2014, there are 400 million Indians, one third of its population who live in poverty (World 
Bank 2014).  
India is facing a new set of challenges when developing both on socio-economic levels and 
when considering climate change, urbanization and globalization (Kumar & Narain, 2014; 
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Nakray, 2015). Questions of fairness arise with the debate on how best to tackle the 
conditions in which India and other developing countries will grow, and with their need to 
consider the environment in ways western countries did not (Standing, 2013). The lack of 
communication between research, academics and policy implementers in India in 
combination with a growing demand for accountability and transparency is shifting the 
governance to be more inclusive and open. One reason for this shift could be the strong 
influence and opinions of international NGOs, transnational corporations, donors and funders 
present in the country and challenging the government’s authority (Kumar & Narain, 2014).  
The pilot of BI or unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) that will be reviewed in this paper was 
conducted between June 2011 and May 2012 and was the first of its kind both in India and in 
the world, subject to this extensive assessment. This is why it has potential to add something 
new to the debate on basic income, since it has not been examined seriously to this extent 
before. Even though cash transfers are in place all over the world, the nature of the pilot study 
and its model was sought to be as close as possible to the universal unconditional original 
idea. The policy implementers also took concern to the hypothetical psychological impacts 
universality would have on recipients. In the Indian pilot different villages were used as 
different communities, where the researchers compared villages that received BI to a control 
group of villages that did not. The project was funded by UNICEF and not a public resource, 
as a BI should according to its definition. Another exception to the original idea is that there 
was one condition, recipients needed to get a bank account within three months of the first 
payment (Standing, 2013; SEWA, 2014).  
1.3 Brazil 
Brazil on the other hand has a population of 206 million, 1/6
th
 of India’s population. BI in 
Brazil has been an active part of public policy since 1995, through the different conditional 
cash transfer programs (CCTs) “Bolsa Esolar” (2001), “Bolsa Alimentação” (2001), ”Auxilio 
Gas” (2002), “Fome Zero” (2003). They were all combined in the “Bolsa Familia Program” 
(BFP) launched in 2003, which later underwent transitions and perfections to the policy 
during 2003-2006 (Lindert et al. 2007; Matarazzo, 2007). Bolsa Escolar originally consisted 
of cash transfers dependent on the children’s school participation rate in the household: to 
receive the transfer the minimum attendance is 85% for children between 8-15 years old. 
Bolsa Alimentação was focused on food and nutrition, which provided extra transfers per 
child for households with income below minimum. It also came with conditions in exchange 
that are: pregnant women needed to get health check ups before, during and after their 
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pregnancy and young children (0-7 years) to get vaccinations according to the Health 
Ministry’s Calendars, all in an attempt to lower infant mortality and malnutrition in the 
country. Auxilio Gas was an initiative to phase out the subsidies for cooking gas and to 
replace them with cash transfers, coherent with the lists of receivers of Bolsa Escolar and 
Bolsa Alimentação. Fome Zero translates to ‘Zero Hunger’ and was an initiative to focus on 
eradicating extreme hunger, presenting an extra cash transfer for families with incomes lower 
than half the minimum wage (Lindert et al. 2007).  
In 2006 there were 45 million people in Brazil benefitting from this program, which is ¼ of 
the population. Many agree that the effects of the BFP have been positive (Matarazzo 2007; 
Lindert et al. 2007; Milanovic 2013; Soares 2012). This program is financed by the ‘Fund to 
Combat and Eradicate Poverty’ (established in 2000) which receives a small part of its 
funding, 0.08%, from financial transactions in the country. The lean towards BI continued in 
2005 when a new law was signed called “Cula” which aims to bring in Citizen Basic Income 
to establish a healthy development and to limit the bureaucracy and stigma around receiving 
the cash transfers (Matarazzo, 2007). 
1.4 Thesis Layout 
In the Methodological and Conceptual Framework the different terms used throughout this 
paper are defined as well as the underlying assumptions made in the reasoning. The 
comparative method of using a six-principle framework is explained. In the theoretical 
framework the theories behind labor supply and Rawls Theory of Justice are elaborated. The 
Analysis chapter explains what can be learned from the Indian and Brazilian experience both 
empirically and with regard to theory. Also the future of BI as a successful policy is debated. 
Finally the Summary of Results and Conclusion sums up main findings in the paper and 
answer the two research questions. 
2. Methodological and Conceptual Framework 
There have been other studies on Basic Income, for example in Canada and Austria, but since 
the main focus for a BI policy is poverty reduction, developing countries are more relevant in 
this case. Why compare Brazil and India and not Kenya and Namibia? There have been 
successful BI studies done in all of these countries. The first reason is the simplest one: the 
research material on BI studies in Brazil and India where the most extensive and available. 
They are also relatively new (the Indian study was conducted during 2011-2012) which make 
them up-to-date with the debate. Also the profile and economic development of Brazil and 
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India have some similar and some widely different aspects, which makes for an interesting 
comparison. On a strictly hypothetical level one can imagine that the size of these countries, 
the distinct cultural differences, their history and their growing economic importance over the 
past decades will add more dimensions to the results. Lastly the fact that both studies have 
shown impressive results by using a Basic Income policy makes them suitable examples to 
compare when looking to investigate if we know enough about BI to rule it in (or out).  
Theoretically, it would make for a more convincing analysis if this study looked at all 
attempts ever made of BI programs around the world in order to find patterns and draw 
generalizations. Doing that would give more width to the research, but might take away from 
the depth in the answers, which are possible when limiting the number of comparisons to two 
examples. Therefor a Comparative Study was the method chosen, instead of a quantitative 
method. 
When looking at these two studies, they are examined in the light of the countries where they 
took place, using Brazil and India as the relevant limit of and definition of a “community”. 
The result will therefor say something about how a BI works in India, relative to India and 
how it works in Brazil, relative to Brazil. In the Indian study the pilot will be considered a 
representation of the whole country, since that is as far as the study covers this paper will use 
its result as an indication of the country at large. The participating villages are located in the 
poorest areas of the country the idea is that this is where a future BI policy would be most 
needed (Standing, 2013).  
Part of the preconceived hypothesis is that culture and other aspects are relevant to the 
outcomes of these studies, and that these factors vary with national borders. Huntington (2013) 
with his ‘Clash of Civilizations’ theory among others would not agree, and claim that cultures 
go broader than nations and perhaps that the scope should be broader. The reader should be 
aware of this limitation in the conceptual framework, and that this paper aims to make country 
specific analysis of the successfulness of BI studies, not global generalizations or 
comparisons. One could theoretically, like Milanovic (2013), claim the whole world is a 
community and that every citizen in the world is comparable when measuring inequalities. 
This type of analysis would be relevant if the design of this paper was to study BI studies 
worldwide. As mentioned, the scope is narrower, therefor the generalizability of these results 
are limited to the respective countries studied and not to the world as a society. 
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When answering research question 2) are results convincing enough to make future policy 
recommendations in favor of Basic Income in other countries? there needs to be a 
clarification of what a successful policy is. When looking for ways to alleviate relative 
poverty in a determined community (country), ones idea of the best way to do so will be 
different depending on ideology, theory and other value based opinions. In order to make 
future policy recommendations in favor of Basic Income, the result of its implementations 
should be successful. In this paper the concept of success is tested by and divided into five 
principals through a framework presented by Guy Standings (2013) in his working paper, 
which presented the results from SEWA/UNICEF’s pilot in India on unconditional basic 
income along with a sixth principle to cover the cost- and practical feasibility which is 
explained more in the Methodological and Conceptual framework.  
The framework is applied on the empirical results from the Brazilian BFP and the Indian pilot 
study, using different evaluating studies done over the years to explain similarities and 
differences between the two. Since the framework incorporates different aspects to poverty 
(more can always be added of course), it covers a greater scope than only economic growth. 
The six principles are explained below, and later put into context in the Analysis chapter. 
2.1. Security Difference Principle 
This first criteria claim a policy is just only if it increases the security and work prospects of 
the least secure groups in a community (as mentioned, the community will be limited to each 
respective country in this paper). It originates from the liberal philosophy of Rawls (1941) 
that economic and social differences between groups are just only if they allow for betterment 
for the worst-off groups. A bit like Robin Hood would think, a policy should primarily look to 
enhance the security (food and health security for example) for those who are on the lowest 
level in the society since they are in need of this safety the most. 
In order to analyze this principle we first need to clarify which the worst off groups are in the 
Brazilian and Indian study. This is not an easy task since the lowest levels in society tend to 
be left out of national statistics and programs. We might not even know which the worst off 
are, simply because we do not know about them or their circumstances (Milanovic, 2013). 
India is a special case where they have had a caste system for thousands of years, which, 
although not officially recognized any longer today, is still an important aspect to the socio-
economic structure in the country (Bidner 2013). Brazil has been known for its big 
differences between wealthy elite and poor citizens, but since president Lula’s rule (2003-
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2010) differences are considered to be shrinking (Hunter & Borges Sugiyama 2013; 
Milanovic 2013). Since no new data is gathered in this paper, we will assume the results 
regarding the most unsecure groups, which were found in the studies, are accurate. 
2.2 Paternalism Test Principle 
The second principle talks about the importance of voicing the most disadvantaged in the 
society. As a consequence, a policy is only just if it does not impose controls on groups which 
are not imposed on the freest groups in society. For example forcing people to do a certain 
type of job which others are not expected to do is not socially just. This idea comes from the 
Millian view that paternalism constrains the freedom of the disadvantaged in a society. There 
are studies on happiness (Haidt, 2006) which conclude that people are happier when they are 
more in control of their own behavior and life, in contrast to when these choices are being 
dictated by a state or institutions (Standing, 2013). 
2.3 Rights Not Charity Principle 
A policy is socially just only if it enhances the power of its recipients and limits the power of 
its providers. This is considered key in the design of the Indian pilot study, since it is often 
overlooked in other versions of BI. Standing (2013) expresses it as that “people should not 
plead for assistance in times of crises” (p.22). This principle is connected to the debated “right 
to work” which is supposedly owned by everyone. However if this right exists, then someone 
is in consequence responsible for providing everyone with work. Also everyone should in that 
case be presented with the same possibilities to pursue any work. Guaranteeing jobs that 
people do not want to do is not a successful way of carrying out this responsibility. Policies 
should be evaluated depending on if they strengthen or weaken these rights. 
2.4 Ecological Constraint Principle  
A policy is just if it does not involve an ecological cost borne by the community affected by it. 
This principle incorporates the much-needed social cost aspect into the economical 
motivations for policy evaluation. Since global warming will affect the populations in 
developing countries to a huge extent, this principle is a key when looking at poverty 
eradicating actions. The notion that this is unfair in context to the development of today’s 
high income countries, who all developed without taking into account the burden of 
environmental consequences, can be rightfully stressed but since this responsibility is on 
everyone’s shoulders it needs to be considered when forming policy. 
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2.5 Dignified Work Principle 
A policy is just if it does not impede people from pursuing work in a dignified way, and if it 
does not disadvantage the most insecure groups in that way. The two-step way to test this is to 
see if 1) work that is dignifying is worth pursuing, and if 2) the policy enhances the range and 
quality of work options of the most insecure groups more than for the other groups. This 
principle is connected to the 2
nd
 one on Paternalism, both stressing the need for a policy to 
take concern of equal possibilities for all groups of society to pursue meaningful lives. 
2.6 Economic and Implementary Constraint Principle 
A 6
th
 principle is added to the analysis, which is not included in the five principle framework 
above, in order to include Economic and Implementary feasibility. Without this the debate in 
the Analysis chapter will not be convincing enough to answer the research questions fully. 
The criteria which are covered in this principle are derived from some of the most common 
critiques against BI, which are conveniently summed up by Tod (2008) into three categories, 
of which the last two are mostly incorporated into the 6
th
 principle, while the first one is 
covered in the theory chapter: 
1) unconditionality is unjust, the society should demand returns for its services. 
2) a BI is set either too high to be economically feasible or too low to alleviate poverty.  
3) a BI risks causing incentives to drop out of the labor force, again reducing the economic 
efficiency.  
A policy is just if it has a feasible financial cost to the society it is implemented in. If it 
changes labor incentives, budget or other institutional structures in a negative way (to a bigger 
extent than available alternatives) it is not just. Logically, a policy cannot be deemed 
successful if it “costs more than it tastes” in terms of being reasonable for the budget of the 
community or if resulting in negative labor market trends: hence the financial and practical 
sustainability is crucial.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter the different theories that are used in the following Analysis chapter are 
explained in more detail. This is to enable a theoretical background to the findings to 
complement the empirical one.  
The traits of a BI that differentiate from any other social policy in place today, is that it is 
universal and unconditional which gives it an ideologically and philosophically different 
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foundation. The idea that the state, and not the labor market, should be responsible for 
securing citizen income therefor makes for quite an unconventional approach, since it 
undermines the labor markets efficiency in providing sufficient and fair wages (Feminist 
Economics, 2001). 
Many authors on Basic Income (Standing, 2013; Van Parjis, 2000; Tod, 2008) identify the 
links between Rawls (1941) “Theory of Justice” and the main ideas behind a BI.   
3.1 Rawls Theory of Justice 
Rawls made his Theory of Justice in light of his background in social contract theory. The 
idea is that all members of a society start from an original position before making a decision, 
and this position is from behind a “veil of ignorance”. His thought is that if everyone is 
oblivious to their own personal traits, qualities and differences, the decisions that are agreed 
upon will be fair to all. Since agreements are then made without regard to anyone’s less or 
greater value, the idea is that no one will be able to guard his or her own interest in the 
agreement (Rawls, 1974). 
Based on this “original state” of choosing, Rawls claims that the natural order would be for all 
members of a society to receive equal shares in their community’s social and economic 
benefits. This claim rests on Rawls belief that each member of a society has an equal right to 
that society’s goods (1974). This theory also assumes the position that people are born into 
families without any possibility to choose their circumstances, nor their intelligence, beauty or 
other capabilities they might have. Individuals do not own personal qualities, so certain 
people should not receive benefits for having desirable attributes since they did nothing to 
‘deserve’ them (Rawls, 1971). 
The first draft of the book A Theory of Justice was published in 1971, and then revised and 
more elaborated in new drafts and translations in 1974 and 1975. The theory is divided into 
two principles of justice simplified by Martin (2015): 
1) everyone has the same right to the same basic liberty in his or her society (political 
liberty, freedom of speech, the right to run for office etcetera). 
2) social inequalities need to be ordered so that they: 
a) are minimized between the top and bottom groups of the society 
b) are most beneficial to the least-advantaged members of the society (in line with 
the 1
st
 Security and Difference Principle in the methodology chapter!) 
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These two principles are incorporated in Standings framework (2013) along with the ideas of 
universality in his design of the Indian BI pilot. The Bolsa Familia Program on the other hand 
(like most other BI-type policies around) does not incorporate universality. 
3.2 Labor Economics and Employment Incentives
 
(University of British Colombia, 2015) 
This classic curve for labor supply is not foreign to any economist. In short, the Y-axis 
demonstrates the income that an individual receives and the X-axis demonstrates the number 
of hours the worker will devote to leisure time relative to work hours. The indifference curves 
U0, U1, U2 and U3 represent the different allocations of time and salary preferred by a 
specific worker. The tilted lines J-Z and K-X are this worker’s budget restriction and show 
how the wage differs relative to the number of hours devoted to work. If the budget restriction 
is not met, the time is either not maximized or the worker is living beyond his or her financial 
limits, which over time will result in (loans and) bankruptcy (Lundmark, 2012; Borjas, 2012).  
Theoretically, he or she can work 24 hours of the day and get the maximum wage where the 
J-line intersect the Y-axis (if that is his or her budget restriction). Suppose a person has the 
budget restriction of J-Z and does not work any hours, the income would be zero and the 
leisure time would be 24 out of 24 hours. Where the indifference curve and budget restriction 
are tangent (point A and B in the figure) is where the hours of work is maximized relative to 
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the individual’s preferences. The hours devoted to work are then equal to the wage this 
worker deems worthy of his or her sacrifice of leisure time (Lundmark, 2010).  
If the worker would allocate his or her time according to the indifference curve U0, one 
alternative is that the curve would intersect the budget restriction at too low a wage, where the 
worker would gain from working more hours (intersection between indifference curve U0 and 
budget restriction J-Z on the right side of point A). The other alternative outcome is when the 
worker spends more hours working than what is optimal according his or her preferences 
(intersection between U0 and budget restriction J-Z to the left of point A). The utility is not 
maximized since the time spent working is now more than what the worker deems “worth” 
the additional salary, since he or she would prefer to have more leisure time. If the hours of 
work were decreased to point A, the salary would correspond to the workers preferences and 
generate more utility.  
What is important to point out is that few workers actually have the possibility to affect their 
working hours as freely as this model suggests, as the length of a work day is often set by the 
supplier of labor or together with a union. Another criticized assumption with this model is 
that labor and leisure time are equal for all workers. The time spent not working varies a great 
deal with gender, culture and overall social status. Imagine for example a mother of three 
working full time in a developing country, who is also responsible for her household when 
she gets home. Compare this worker to a young single woman in a Western country who is 
free to do what she wants when she gets out of work, since her salary allows her to eat out and 
afford cleaning help (Borjas, 2012). 
The vertical line between endowment point X and Z demonstrates the non-labor income and 
could for example be a heritage, unemployment compensation or cash gifts. This non-labor 
income is believed to lower the incentives to work (Borjas, 2012), since it makes leisure 
relatively cheaper (if assuming it to be a normal good). This starting point matters a lot more 
when you compare the scenarios of starting at endowment Z (nothing) and endowment X. If 
you have no liquidity in your budget you are, as a direct effect of that, more vulnerable if 
something unexpected happens which requires money. Suppose you have to take a loan to pay 
an emergency medical bill, later you have to pay it back with additional interest which puts 
you even further behind in your starting position. 
As a result, if you start in endowment Z you request less wage for your hours of work because 
you need it more than a person starting in point X, who will require more since he or she 
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already has the safety of a starting capital. This is essentially how the BI is meant to work, not 
to support a person completely but to give the security of having something to build off of 
(Tod, 2008). 
4. Analysis 
In the Analysis the two studies are compared, first with a summarizing table of the similar and 
different results the two BI studies. The table is followed by a more detailed analysis of each 
principle in the six-principle framework, with empirical examples from the studies and theory 
to support the reasoning. The chapter is rounded up with Other Results (which are side 
findings not included in the original questioning) and lastly a Summary of Results where the 
research questions are answered. 
 Similarities Differences 
1. Security 
Difference 
Principle 
Programs are targeting the least secure 
groups. 
Women are more empowered. 
BPF pays out on household level. The 
Indian pilot pays on individual bases. 
2. Paternalism Test 
Principle 
- BFP is means tested and comes with 
conditionalities. The Indian pilot was 
universal and only required a bank 
account. 
3. Rights Not 
Charity Principle 
Payments could create a dependency 
relation from recievers to givers.  
The private liquidity gives recievers 
more decision making power. 
Not an entitlement in BFP. Only 
selected families recieve the transfers, 
which could cause uninclusiveness. 
4. Ecological 
Constraint 
Principle 
No direct impacts on the environment. 
The positive trend in school 
participation could cause more 
educated generations, who live more 
sustainable lives 
- 
5. Dignified Work 
Principle 
Generated a small drop in overall labor 
supply from recipients in Brazil and for 
tribal households in the Indian pilot. 
Neither of the studies pushes 
reciepients into any specific labor. 
The income-generating work and 
productivity was documented higher in 
the other BI-receiving Indian villages: 
markets were created instead of 
subsidized food shops 
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4.1 Security Difference Principle 
In the Indian pilot, there was a differentiation made between the examined villages. They 
were separated into four categories: the first two village-categories received BI and were 
differentiated between those with the operating presence of an NGO (SEWA) and villages 
without the presence of an NGO. The other two categories were control groups for each of the 
first two categories and did not receive any basic income. The pilot also extended to include 
one tribal village, along with one tribal control village. This last group was identified by the 
research team as consisting of the most underdeveloped, segregated and poorest populations 
(SEWA Bharat, 2014; Standing, 2013).  
The BI also had the largest effect in this tribal minority village: 73 % of tribal households had 
reduced their debt, tribal women increased their work participation rate with 16%. Sanitation 
and access to drinking water improved for this group and also the degree to which tribal 
recipients were able to secure their ownership in household assets (SEWA Bharat, 2014).  
Another aspect to the “most unsecure” group is gender. Girl’s weight-for-age and school 
enrollment improved more than boys in the villages receiving BI. Women along with elderly 
and handicapped in villages receiving BI reported having a bigger say in the household 
decision-making (Standing 2012, SEWA Bharat 2014). In line with this principle, the result of 
the BI pilot in India was most beneficial to the least secure groups in society and fulfills this 
principle. 
6. Economic and 
Implementation 
Constraint 
Principle 
Implementation was successful and 
economically feasable. 
In the Indian BI pilot the costs were less 
than previous policies. BFP cut its 
administrative costs when merging the 
four previous programs, but works under 
a budget everyone who needs the 
transfers might not be getting it yet. 
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Weight-for-age distribution for BI villages by gender (pink: female, blue: male, green: WHO 
recommendations) (SEWA Bahrat, 2014) 
 
In the Bolsa Familia Program in Brazil, the recipients of the cash transfer are screened and 
selected by their family average per capita income. If the income is below the minimum level, 
they receive an income supplement as well as extra money for each child and additional 
transfers if the income is under half the minimum level. About ¼ of the Brazilian population 
is benefiting from this cash program (Hall, 2008; Lindert et al. 2007) and in 2005 president 
Marquez signed a law to bring in a Citizen Basic Income (CBI) step by step. The idea is to 
develop cash transfers to require less bureaucracy when determining eligibility and to remove 
stigmas and shame in revealing ones income in order to receive the CBI (Matarozzo, 2007). 
The program indeed seeks to target the least secure groups and also ends up having succeful 
results in this matter. When looking at the precision of the BFP numbers from 2007 it shows 
that 73% of the tranfers reaches out to the poorest quintile and 95% reaches the two poorest 
quintiles. These are quite impressive numbers (Lindert et al. 2007). A problem with cash 
transfers on family level is that they might ignore the within family dynamic of inequalities 
(Van Parjis, 2000). However, in the BFP women are documented to be more empowered in 
household decision-making and less socially isolated as a result of the policy (Soares, 2012). 
BFP also fulfill the Security Difference Principe. 
4.2 Paternalism Test Principle 
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In the Indian study there were no conditionalities put on the recipients of BI besides voluntary 
participation in interviews and case studies that were conducted during the period of the 
intervention. The only requirement in order to receive the monthly payments was that, within 
three months after the beginning of the distribution, recipients needed to have a bank account 
to which the payments could be sent. This was done to lessen the administrative burden and to 
make transfers more efficient. Almost all of the participants were successful in opening a 
bank account (Standing, 2013). 
In the Brazilian case, Bolsa Familia does impose conditionalities on its recipients. There are 
requirements of low income, conditions for school attendance, vaccination for children as 
well as maternal health check-ups for mothers. These controls are not put on the rest of the 
population, and therefor Bolsa Familia is not compliant with this principle. 
Poverty and Extreme Poverty in Brazil, 1999-2009, odd years 
 
(Soares et al. 2010) 
 
The graphs above demonstrate the drop in overall poverty and extreme poverty (to the right) 
and the raise in poverty reduction by percentage points (left) between the years BFP have 
been active in Brazil. Critics thought that the means-tested model in Brazil would make it less 
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successful, but despite these conditionalities, the program appears to have created a sense of 
social inclusion for the recipients of Bolsa Familia (Hunter & Borges Sugiyama, 2014). One 
aspect could be that since such a large proportion of the population is participating in the BFP 
there is less shame associated with it. Another explanation could be the fact that Bolsa 
Familia is partly funded by the combined virtual money transactions in Brazil. This contrast 
might lead to a sense of entitlement for the recipients, instead of feeling like a burden when 
receiving the payments. This is because the recipients are not likely to be the same people as 
the ones making money transaction on the financial market. 
4.3 Rights Not Charity Principle  
The idea that everyone got the BI was deemed important in the Indian pilot, as universality 
and rights-based payments were considered crucial for the success of the pilot. This reasoning 
is much in line with Rawls (1974) ideas. It could be that the history in India, with cast 
determining your social rank at birth, results in universality having a big role in this 
community. The BI seems to have enhanced the power of its recipients in the sense that 
financial liquidity made them less vulnerable when accidents or unexpected costs arose. 
Power was taken away from local loan sharks (who were the only ones with negative 
experiences from the BI test). The endebtment sunk during the pilot as receivers were able to 
save their own money with the BI:  
Percent of Households by Change In Debt and Village Type 
 
(SEWA Bharat, 2014) 
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The diagram demonstrates the difference between households in villages that received BI, the 
ones who received it and had the NGO SEWA present, and their respective control groups. 
The difference between the BI-groups and their controls when it comes to the households’ 
capacity to reduce debt is 15% for the ones with SEWA present, and 4% for the non-SEWA 
ones. If one relates financial independence to power, then the Indian study fulfills this Rights-
not-Charity Principle.  
Liquidity is an aspect that needs to be emphasized in this argument. Relating to the Labor 
Supply Curve, we saw that the difference between starting from zero capital and to have a 
non-labor income is crucial, especially for the least secure groups in a society. Chances are 
that they are the least able to get a loan or to know someone who has financial assets. 
Liquidity is also connected to the power of decision-making, which is given to the recipients 
with the responsibility to make their own choices for what they need (Standing, 2012). 
Critics to the Bolsa Familiar Program like Hall (2008) claim that it only serves as short time 
poverty alleviation and that it instead creates dependency relation from the receivers of the 
cash transfers to the government. This dependency problem would in that case be present in 
the Indian study too, but to a less extent since it is universal and all groups would be 
dependent but to different degrees, and then not comply with Rawls idea that everyone has the 
same entitlement since some would be more dependent than others.  
Since BI is a relatively new policy it has not been institutionalized long enough in Brazil to 
expect it to be a fully integrated part of the political system. If it continues to be successful 
one could assume it would become a more given part of the political policies, and less of a 
dependency or charity phenomenon. As is the case today, the “Rights not Charity” principle is 
not fulfilled in the BFP since we cannot tell if power is in reality re-distributed to the 
vulnerable groups, or if success is short term and that the government who provide the 
transfers will continue to hold the concentrated power. 
4.4 Ecological Constraint Principle 
There were no direct links between ecological constraints and the BI pilot in India or the BFP 
in Brazil. One indirect consequence is the improved education results in both cases, through 
conditions in Brazil and autonomously in India. Assuming the primary education includes 
information on sustainability, it could be seen as an investment in future generations to make 
sure they lead environmentally conscious lives. The physical ecological cost and burden of 
transporting food subsidies before, compared to managing cash transfers during in the Indian 
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study is possibly a lightening of the ecological constraint. The de-centralized creation of 
markets in the villages instead of subsidy shops is likely more efficient in covering the local 
demand for (local) food, and also creates jobs in supplying food and selling it. 
4.5 Dignified Work Principle 
This principle says one can test if a policy is just by testing if it fulfills these two steps: 
1) work that is dignifying is worth pursuing 2) the policy should enhance the range and 
quality of work options for the most insecure groups more than for others. 
In India, the BI transfers created markets in the receiving villages since respondents were able 
to buy better seed and grow more crops, which resulted in a more productive labor and trade 
activity compared to the control villages. Corruption decreased, which was an integrated part 
of the food subsidy system (Standing, 2013; SEWA Bahrat, 2014).  
Percent of Households with Increase in Income-Earning Work, by Village Type 
 
 (SEWA Bahrat, 2014) 
The graph shows how many percent of households increased their income-earning or 
productive work (blue column to the left) in the BI villages compared to the control villages 
(red column to the right). This result is not compliant with the Labor Supply Curve, which 
instead suggested that labor would drop when people receive more non-labor income. 
The exception to this is the tribal plot: where more ownership over property and gadgets, 
along with less time spent working as a contractor on someone else’s projects and more time 
to tend to their own projects was reported by the tribal BI village respondents (Standing, 
2012). This phenomenon can be seen both as a drop in the labor supply for paid labor from 
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the tribal workers participating in the pilot and as increased freedom to choose not to work 
when it is not dignifying. 
In Brazil’s a small, borderline significant decrease in labor supply was detectible as a result of 
receiving the BI (Lindert et al. 2007). In the case of the BFP the hypothesis from the Labor 
Supply Curve is somewhat correct, when people receive non-labor income they are less likely 
to work. The reason why this differs between the studies could be any of the different designs 
aspects (conditionality, means-testing, universality) in the models of the policies, and should 
be subject to further research to clarify which ones. Soares (2012) for example argues that 
looking for a job is a costly activity, and therefor receiving a non-labor income should 
improve employment chances, regardless of it being means-tested or not.  
4.6 Economic and Implementary Constraint Principle  
In the Indian BI pilot, the amount given to each adult was 300 rupees (4.2 euros) per month, 
and 150 rupees for children (www.valuta.se, 2015). The sum is not sought to be compensating 
for a wage, but rather complementary to it. Designers of this study imagined that the transfer 
would therefor not be a dis-incentive to work, but still enough to keep extremely poor people 
afloat. Banks were involved in order to help villagers (who did not already have one) open up 
bank accounts, and 98.1 % of the participating people successfully did (Standing, 2012; 
SEWA Bahrat, 2014). The administrative cost of having someone distributing the physical 
money was thereby cut, along with the risk of corruption or errors in the transfers. One of the 
most impressive results in the Indian Pilot is that the total cost of handing out BI to the 
villagers was actually cheaper that the combined cost of different policies that had been 
implemented in the villages before. Standing (2013) believes the high level of corruption is 
mainly to blame for the inefficiency and expensiveness of having a centralized policy for 
poverty alleviation.  
Brazils decentralized implementation of Bolsa Familia on a municipality level is believed to 
have had a role in its success in targeting and implementing the cash transfers (Lindert et al. 
2007). Unlike the Indian pilot, the BFP limits the cash transfers to households under a poverty 
line and/or under an extreme poverty line and also depending on how many children the 
household has.  
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BFP amounts 2004-2011 
(Soares, 2012). 
In 2011, as can be seen in the table above, the fixed amount was 70 real which is equal to 16,1 
euros (valuta.se, 2015).  The variable benefit is added per child, the maximum amount of 
children for which you can receive the extra benefit has been raised from 3 to 5 due to the low 
birth rates in the country (Lindert et al. 2015). Note also that these amounts are for a 
household and not per individual, and that it is in nominal and not real terms. According to 
Soares and Terron’s coefficient (2012) the estimated total cost of the Bolsa Familia Program 
was 0.5% of Brazils total GDP in 2006. 
The BFP is registered by the National Citizens Income Secretariat (Secretaria Nacional de 
Renda de Cidadania – SENARC) and payed out and run by the federal bank Caixa Econômica 
Federal. The payments are not entitlements in the sense that they are distributed according to 
coverage, when the budget is filled no more families can enter unless another family leaves 
(Soares, 2012). 
Taxation on income could be an alternative way to finance Basic Income policies, in order to 
balance out the differences and also to be able to identify the most efficient amount. This way 
everyone would receive the BI but people who make more money would also pay more taxes, 
and that way be allowed to pursue higher wages if they wish to, but still ensuring everyone 
has enough to survive. A good way to re-distribute financial resources could also be to target 
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the banking sector, as is the case in Brazil, which is often not included or taxed through the 
government. 
 
4.7 Other Results 
One important result is that BI seems to be efficient when implemented in a decentralized 
way. That is, it needs to be easy to distribute and done so in an effective way close to the 
receivers. Delegating responsibility to municipalities in Brazil is one way of moving the 
policy closer to its receivers, limiting the number of steps it has to go through before reaching 
its target. In the Indian study, the variable of having an active NGO in the villages had a 
positive effect on the results of most categories. 
Since both studies are deemed successful, although the Brazilian one does not fulfill most of 
the principles in the framework, it seems that there are other factors relevant to the success of 
a policy than the ones brought up. The methodology might simply not be covering enough 
aspects of what determines the successfulness of a policy, or perhaps what can be concluded 
is that these factors differ and have different importance in different communities. 
Another result that should be highlighted is the positive effects on fighting inequality that was 
present in both studies, which goes hand in hand with poverty reduction and social inclusion. 
Differences seem to be diminished when people are given the same rights-based advantages. 
4.8 Summary of Results 
1. What were the results of the Indian and Brazilian BI study, and where they similar to 
the ones that could be expected from theoretical and empirical experience? 
2. Are results convincing enough to make future policy recommendations in favor of 
Basic Income in other countries? 
The results differed between the two studies, the BFP seems to be a litte more in line with 
what was expected from the classic economic theories in that it generated a small drop in 
labor supply. Besides that, results from the BFP did not confirm Rawls (1974) theories 
emphasizing the importance of the cash transfers being rights based and not means tested. The 
Indian study complied with most of the framework for a successful policy, and differed a lot 
in policy design from the BFP. 
Since both studies generated impressive and positive results in terms of reducing poverty 
(primarely in the short term results) but used quite different BI policies, it is relevant for 
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future research to look at what these ‘other factors’ that affect the result are, before 
recommending other countries to implement a specific Basic Income policy. Further research 
on the connection to and interaction with the labor market will also be necessary before 
concluding the successfulness of Basic Income as a policy for poverty alleviation.  
5. Conclusion 
Basic income seems to have a positive effect on the relative and absolute poverty reduction in 
the cases of Bolsa Famila in Brazil, and the pilot of Unconditional Basic Income Grants in 
India. It also decreases inequalities and improves social inclusion in these two cases. More 
research is needed around what other social and cultural conditions enable BI to be successful 
before recommending other countries to implement the policy, in order to explain why these 
two different models both reached positive results. 
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